Abstract: Do firms neglect competition when making entry decisions? Using a dataset of 14,973 eBay auctions this paper addresses this question analyzing the time of day at which sellers set their auctions to end. Consistent with competition neglect, it is found that (i) a disproportionate share of auctions end during peak bidding hours, (ii) such hours exhibit lower selling rates and prices, (iii) peak listing is more prevalent among sellers likely to have chosen ending-time strategically, suggesting disproportionate entry is a mistake driven by bounded rationality rather than mindlessness. The results highlight the importance for marketing researchers of assessing rather than assuming the rationality of firm behavior.
Introduction
A basic premise of game theory is that agents choose among different courses of action taking into account how the decisions of other agents influence their relative profitability. Firms, for example, are supposed to make entry and production decisions based on residual rather than aggregate demand, taking into account the impact of competitors on the demand they face.
This assumes that firms behave rationally. What may we expect if they were only boundedly-rational? Abundant experimental and survey-based evidence has shown that people exhibit competition neglect, that is, that they tend to choose actions which maximize profits in the absence of competition, but which do not necessarily do so in its presence Moore and Cain (2004) find that too many subjects choose to compete on easy tasks and too few on difficult ones (see also Radzevick and Moore, 2008) . Camerer and Lovallo (1999) find that subjects do not adjust behavior sufficiently when competing against self-selected vs.
non-self-selected competitors. Real world managers report seeing a small fraction of their actual competitors as rivals (Grisprud and Gronhaug, 1985, Porac et al., 1989) , and entrepreneurs report making entry decisions focusing primarily on variables under their own control, mostly ignoring competition (Moore, Oesch and Zietsma, 2004) .
In this paper I propose and test a new prediction that arises from applying the notion of competition neglect to the decision firms face as to which of many possible markets to enter; if entrants do not sufficiently take into account the impact of competition, they will tend to erroneously equalize residual demand with aggregate demand disproportionately entering markets with greater aggregate demand. This would lead, for example, to too many restaurants opening in densely populated areas, to too many new radio stations for popular genres, and to too many gadgets being released shortly before Christmas.
Testing this prediction with non-experimental data is problematic, of course, because markets that differ in aggregate demand also differ in other dimensions that are relevant for both entry and profitability, such as operational costs, barriers to entry, and uncertainty. Furthermore, the goods and services sold across markets that differ in aggregate demand are often heterogeneous themselves. In this paper I examine this prediction of excessive entry into high demand markets in a real market setting that is all but free of such confounds: the time of day at which eBay sellers choose to end their auctions.
Previous research has consistently documented that online auctions receive a high share of bids as they are about to end, 1 creating a relationship between an auction's ending-time and the demand it faces. The fortune of an auction ending at 8PM will tend to be determined by bidders who are online in the evening, while that of an auction ending at noon by morning bidders. In other words, as a consequence of last-minute-bidding, eBay consists of multiple quasi-independent sequential markets that differ almost exclusively on their demand levels. If sellers neglect competition, they will tend to disproportionately choose to end their auctions during the times of day when more bidders are online.
I test this prediction with data from 11,796 auctions for best-selling single-DVD movies (e.g., Monsters Inc.), and 3,177 auctions for frequently offered multiple-DVD bundles (e.g., first
season of TV show Friends). Consistent with competition neglect, both supply (auctions ending) and demand (bids being placed) peak in the evening, but the peak of supply is significantly more pronounced than that of demand. For example, between 5:00 and 8:59 PM bidders place 25.0%
of their bids, compared to the 37.6% of all auctions that end during such hours (see Figure 2 ).
Various additional analyses suggest that the bidders' peak is exogenous with respect to the 1 For reviews see section 3 in (Bajari and Hortacsu, 2004) and section 4 in (Ockenfels et al., 2006) behavior of sellers (e.g., visits to Amazon.com have a very similar pattern and experience is uncorrelated with time-of-day at which bids are placed).
Sellers' disproportionate entry has consequences: their profits are lower during peak bidding hours. An average seller listing her auction at around noon rather than around 8PM, for example, would increase her odds of selling a single-DVD by 13 percentage points and increase its expected price by about 38 cents (a 4% increase). For a DVD bundle the consequences would be a 5 percentage point increase in probability of sale and $3.41 in final price (a 6% increase).
I interpret such disproportionate entry into, and lower profits during peak bidding hours as evidence that competition neglect influences both eBay sellers' decisions and market outcomes. The most plausible alternative explanation relies on listing costs. In particular,
considering that eBay auctions end at the same time of day as when sellers list them, if listing during peak bidding hours is more convenient (less costly), then sellers may willingly accept a lower expected profit for listing at such times.
Several additional analyses suggest this explanation does not account for the excessive entry results. For example, sellers who pay a fee that allows them to change the default endingtime of their auction, end a higher share of their auctions during the peak (48%) than sellers not paying the fee do (37%xxx). Also, subsets of sellers that should be less influenced by the convenience of early-evening listing, such as stores, sellers listing on a weekend, and sellers listing more expensive items, all end a similar share of their auctions during peak hours as the rest of sellers do.
One concern with studying entry decisions with auction data is the question of whether eBay sellers are in fact firms who seek to maximize profits (rather than individuals, say, getting rid of unwanted items). This issue is discussed in some detail in the Conclusions section, but it is worth mentioning here that an important share of items in the data are listed by large sellers and that, furthermore, such sellers are more rather than less likely to excessively end their auctions during the peak-demand period. In fact, additional analyses suggest that the excessive entry into peak-bidding hours is driven primarily by professional sellers, not individuals.
In documenting sellers' failure to take into account relevant factors when making decisions this paper is related to a growing empirical literature studying inattention. Recent research, for example, has shown evidence of inattention to non-saliently displayed prices (Han Lee and Malmendier, 2007 , Hossain and Morgan, 2006 , Simonsohn and Ariely, 2008 , to information that competes with attention-grabbing or abundant information (DellaVigna and Pollet, Forthcoming, Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007, Hirshleifer et al., 2007) and to future events occurring beyond immediate planning horizons (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2007) . More broadly, it is also related to growing literature that employs field data to study psychological biases in real world behavior (for a review see DellaVigna, forthcoming).
Data Description and the Disproportionate Entry Pattern Some relevant details of how eBay works
Although many eBay sellers are individuals who sell sporadically, eBay is progressively attracting sellers who use eBay to sell large numbers of items. Indeed, many stores use eBay as their main distribution channel for both new and used items. Over half the items in the sample used in this paper, for example, were listed by sellers listing at least 300 DVDs during the first 9 months of 2002.
IMPORTANT: By default, auctions end at the same time of day as when sellers list them. For example, suppose a seller sets up a three-day auction at 10:17AM on Monday; this auction would start immediately and end on Thursday at 10:17AM. Sellers have an option to pay a 10-cents scheduling fee that allows them to start (and hence end) their auction at a time other than when they list it.
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The Dataset
Data description. The raw data, provided by eBay directly, contains information on over 500,000 auctions, and their corresponding over 1.2 million bids, encompassing all auctions taking place in October of 2002 in the DVD-movie category. Because eBay does not employ product-codes that uniquely identify items being auctioned (e.g., UPCs or ISBNs), bidders and researchers must rely on sellers' descriptions of their items to identify the products being auctioned. For this reason I conducted an item identification process, described in detail in the appendix, to create two subsamples. One contains single-DVD movies that were listed as weekly best-sellers at IMDB.com at least once during the ten weeks preceding the sampling period (e.g., the film "A Beautiful Mind"), and the other contains common multiple-DVD packs (e.g., the first season of the TV show "24").
Descriptive Statistics. 
Late Bidding
As mentioned in the introduction, a number of papers have shown that a substantial share of bids arrive as auctions are about to end. The auctions in this sample are no exception. Over 60% of winning bids arrive with less than 3 hours left in the auction and fully 18% of them during an auction's last minute.
Given that a key premise in this paper is that last-minute-bidding creates a link between an auction's ending-time and the bidders that end up determining its fate, it is important to assess the prevalence of last-minute bidding through the day. Multiple bids by the same bidder are excluded, keeping only a bidder's last bid (this is the time when the bid was actually placed, excluding automatic revisions by eBay's proxy bidding system).
The figure shows that the frequency of new bids increases consistently through the day until reaching a peak at around 5PM, and then it slowly declines till the end of the day. Auctions show a qualitatively similar pattern but, consistent with competition neglect, the auction's peak is much more pronounced than that of bids'. Between 5:00PM and 8:59 PM bidders place 25%
of their bids, while sellers set 37.6% of their auctions to end. This difference is, not surprisingly given the number of observations involved, statistically significant: Z = 28.29, p < .0001. Are the peaks strategic?
3 The peak includes more than 25% of auctions for 94% of movie titles in the sample. 4 Note that bids are only observed if they are for amounts above the current price. Such censoring increases at times of day when prices are higher. We will see that the peak-demand period exhibits lower prices, which means that there is more censoring during off-peak hours, so the true difference in bids/auction is likely to be even more pronounced than what is documented above. 4 None of the results presented above change noticeably when time of day effects are computed separately for weekdays and weekends, or for both samples separately.
The paper studies how sellers respond to daily variation in demand, assuming that the timing of bids is exogenous. In what follows I first assess the validity of this premise and then look more closely at how strategic seller-behavior is.
Demand's peak. One way to assess if the actions of sellers influence the time of day at which bidders participate on eBay is to compare the timing of eBay bids through the day to the distribution of visits to other shopping-related websites, where time plays no strategic role.
To conduct this comparison I obtained data from comScore Inc., a panel of 2,000,000 internet users. In particular, I downloaded data from a random sample of 100,000 users, available from Wharton Research Data Services (http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu), and computed the percentage of daily visits to Amazon.com by hour (employing data also from October of 2002). According to these data, 25.9% of visits to Amazon.com took place between 5:00PM and 8:59PM, a figure that is quite similar to the 25.0% of eBay bids being placed at such hours.
Moreover, the correlation between hourly visits to Amazon.com and hourly bids on eBay, computed with 24 observations -one for each hour of the day-is a striking r = .98.
Another approach is to consider bidders' experience. We might expect that bidders with more experience become more strategic. Simonsohn & Ariely (2008) , for instance, find that experienced bidders learn not to herd behind non-diagnostic bids. If the timing of bids was a strategic decision, then it would be expected to be influenced by experience. Figure 3 depicts the share of bids placed between 5:00 and 8:59 PM as a function of bidder experience (as proxied by their bidder rating). The flat line for bidders shows that experience is not associated with the tendency to bid during peak bidding hours (the impact of experience on sellers is discussed later).
Another indication that bidders are not choosing their bidding time strategically is that, as we saw earlier, late-bidding does not fluctuate much through the day (see Figure 1 ). If bidders were actively responding to supply changes through the day, they would be expected to vary the likelihood of bidding on auctions that are ending soon, as a function of how saturated the time of day at which they are visiting eBay is, but they do not.
Finally, none of the advice books, discussed in detail later, nor any of the online bulletin boards I informally visited to address this question, make explicit recommendations about the time of day at which bids should be placed. In sum, the assumption that sellers can take fluctuations in demand through the day as exogenous seems warranted.
Supply's peak. Because auctions end by default at the same time of day as when they are listed, it is possible for sellers to "choose" ending-times without thinking about it. It is hence conceivable that the pattern of excessive entry is the result of mindlessness rather than of competition neglect per-se. To address this issue empirically, I assessed whether sellers inferred to be making ending-time decisions intentionally/strategically are more likely to end their auctions during the peak.
Intentionality, unfortunately, is of course unobservable. I do consider four different proxies for it: (i) paying a scheduling fee to opt-out of the default ending-time, (ii) choosing a rounded ending-time (e.g. 10.00AM rather than 9:59 or 10:01), (iii) consistently choosing similar ending-times for different auctions, and (iv) seller experience. As we shall see, all four proxies lead to results consistent with the disproportionate entry pattern being driven by a conscious yet mistaken logic rather than by random carelessness.
(i) Scheduling fee. Sellers paying this fee must explicit set an ending-time (they must type it into a textbox) so they are less likely (if at all) to list an auction without thinking about its ending-time. Consistent with sellers choosing to disproportionately enter the peak, a higher share of auctions listed with a scheduling fee end during the peak (48%) than of auctions listed without it (36%). Though the difference is quite marked, very few auctions were listed using this scheduling fee (around 1.6%), perhaps because sellers can determine the ending-time of their auction for free by listing their item at the desired time, or by using software that will automatically list for them at a predetermined time.
(ii) Rounded ending-times. Considering that people actively choosing a time-of-day are likely to choose rounded times (e.g. 10:00AM rather than 9:57AM or 10:03AM), roundedness may act as a proxy for sellers having actively chosen an ending-time.
I tested the face validity of this assumption by assessing how prevalent rounded times were among auctions listed using the scheduling fee just discussed. A striking 44.4% of scheduled auctions ended in xx:00 or xx:30, compared to just 4.1 % of those listed without the scheduling fee. In the single and multiple-DVD samples, 5.2% have a rounded ending-time, 46.8% of these end during the peak, a noticeably higher share than the 37.1% of non-rounded ones. Excluding auction listed with the scheduling fee these figures are 41.7% and 36.8% respectively.
(iii) Consistency. Sellers who systematically choose the same ending-time for their auctions are more likely to be doing so intentionally. Unlike the previous two proxies this one can be applied to most sellers in the sample (only sellers with few auctions are excluded) but it is a noisier proxy, as sellers may intentionally spread out their auctions or they may cluster them due to external constrains.
To quantify consistency of ending time I used a seller's average deviation of ending-time across auctions (taking into account that time is reset daily, that is, that between 11.59PM and 12:01AM there are just 2 minutes rather than 23 hours and 58 minutes). I use variance in one half of the month to predict ending-time decisions in the other half with the full dataset of DVD auctions. Sellers with less than 5 auctions in one half of the month were excluded from this analysis (the results are robust to excluding sellers with less than 3 or less than 10 auctions). 
Convenience as an alternative explanation
In this section I consider the possibility that the disproportionate share of auctions ending during the peak is caused by the greater "convenience" associated with listing items at such hours. Considering that by default an auction's ending time coincides with the time of day at which it is listed, if listing during peak hours is less costly, then it may be optimal for a disproportionate share of sellers to do so, even if -as we shall see in the next section-it leads to lower probability of sale and prices.
The assumption on which such story relies is reasonable, listing costs may very well vary through the day as a function, for example, of the opportunity cost of time. Note, however, that to explain a more pronounced peak for auctions, the listing cost explanation requires that for sellers the costs differences through the day are steeper than for bidders.
A listing cost based explanation leads to several testable predictions. First, sellers who would be expected to face flatter listing costs through the day, such as stores, large sellers, and sellers listing on weekends, should exhibit a less pronounced peak. This, however, is not the case as these subsets of sellers end 38%, 45% and 34%, respectively, of their auctions during the peak (compared, recall, to 36.7% of all auctions, and 25% of bids).
Similarly, since the (differential) cost of listing an item during peak demand hours is probably not dependent on the value of the item being listed, more expensive items should be more likely to be listed off-peak (since the benefits of doing so are greater but the costs constant). More expensive items do show some attenuation in peak-entry, but it is quite slight.
For example, 32% of items starting at $30 or above end in the peak, and 33% of those starting above $60 do.
Finally, sellers who paid the scheduling fee face a constant cost of ending an auction at any time of the day and should therefore exhibit the least peak listing of all, but as was reported above, they show a more pronounced peak (48% of such auctions end in the peak).
An alternative explanation closely related to the listing costs one is that sellers may want to be around when an auction ends, and being around during peak demand hours may be more convenient. This explanation makes the same predictions as the listing cost explanation, with the exception that scheduled auctions would not need to show a less pronounced peak. It makes the additional prediction that auctions ending on a weekend would be less likely to have a more pronounced peak but 36% of them do.
Excessive Entry's Impact on Profits
This section presents results from regression analyses that estimate the impact of ending an auction at times of day when the market is systematically oversupplied on selling prices and probability of sale. Auction final prices are 'censored', or more accurately contain corner solution outcomes (see chapter 16 in Wooldridge, 2002) , because they cannot be lower than the starting price. I hence estimated, as is common in the empirical auctions literature, Tobit regressions to assess the impact on final prices.
The regression analyses control for heterogeneity across items (movie title, and whether the DVD(s) is/are new), auction design options (auction duration, whether it ends on a weekend, shipping charges, starting price and reserve price), and across sellers (seller rating, and whether the seller has a contractual agreement with eBay).
I present below regression results for two alternative key independent variables. The first is simply a set of 23 hourly dummies. Their main advantage is that they create an intuitive and easy to display result. Indeed, I plot the point estimates for these dummies in Figures 6 and 7, creating an easy to visualize daily pattern in probabilities of sale and expected final prices.
Their main disadvantage, on the other hand, is that it is difficult to compare the impact on so many different point estimates of controlling (or not) for observable heterogeneity. In Figure 5 both solid lines show a marked drop that coincides with the peak of the discontinued one: at times of day when sellers disproportionately enter the single-DVD market, both prices and probability of sale show a marked decrease. Prices around 8PM, for instance, are $0.38 lower than around noon, and probability of sale is around 14 percentage points lower. The sample averages for these are $10.16 and 71% respectively.
In Figure 6 the overall pattern is quite similar; here too both probability of sale and prices drop at the times of day when sellers are disproportionately ending their auctions. Prices around 8PM, for example, are $3.41 lower than around noon, and probability of sale is about 5 percentage points lower; the respective sample means are $55.9 and 90% respectively. In order to identify the impact of ending time on auction outcomes that operates only through predictable variation in the A/B-ratio (rather than of contemporaneous shocks which sellers could not anticipate), instead of employing as a predictor the A/B-ratio of the time when auctions actually end, I used instead the average ratio for that same time but for all other days in the sample. For example, the outcome of an auction ending on Tuesday October 8 th at 8.45PM
was predicted with the average A/B-ratio between 5:46PM and 8:45PM for all other working days in October. Due to some differences in the timing of auctions and bids between samples, and between working and non-working days, the average A/B-ratio was computed separately for each of these four subsets of auctions.
I estimated probit regressions with auctions as the unit of observation. The dependent variable equals 1 if an item sold and 0 otherwise, and the key predictor is A/B-ratio. The 6 Between 12AM and 1 AM there are just 49 multiple-DVD auctions; the point estimates for the corresponding hourly dummies in the price regression are hence very noisy and were not included in Figure 6 to improve readability. The missing values are ΔY/ΔX 12AM =-$6.56, ΔY/ΔX 1AM = -$8.27. Also, to provide a reliable comparison between 8PM and noon I compare the average marginal effect between 7-9PM with the average between 11AM-1PM rather than then single estimate at 8PM and 12PM.
regressions also include the various controls for movie, auction design and seller observable differences mentioned above. Table 2 displays the results, expressed as marginal effects (i.e. as changes in predicted probability of sale as the independent variable is increased in 1 unit). Columns 1-3 show the results for the single-DVD sample and columns 4-6 for the multiple-DVD sample. *** Table 2 The marginal effects for all other variables are as would be expected; auctions with lower starting and reserve prices, with lower shipping and lasting more days, and those listed by more experienced sellers are all more likely to sell. The sole surprising result is that of the store dummy which is negative, indicating that sellers who have a contractual agreement with eBay are less likely to sell their auctions. The effect of store controlling for reputation (log(seller rating)), however, is hard to interpret, as one might expect that being a store improves a seller's performance through reputation. If the regression is estimated without controlling for reputation, the marginal effect of store is positive and significant.
To estimate the impact of ending-time on selling price I estimated Tobit regressions with auctions as the unit of observation. The dependent variable equals the selling price for sold auctions and the starting-price for non-sold/'censored' ones. The key predictor is A/B-ratio. The point estimate for the A/B-ratio is negative and significant at the 1% level across all columns. The effect of A/B-ratio is larger for both samples when observable heterogeneity is vs.
is not controlled for (columns 3 vs. 1 and 7 vs. 5), suggesting these results are not due to omitted variable bias. Columns 4 and 8 shows that the negative and significant effect is also found in the OLS regressions.
The marginal effects for all other predictors in Table 3 are as would be expected;
auctions with higher starting-prices and reserve prices, those with lower shipping and lasting more days, and those listed by more experienced sellers are all more likely to sell. The sole surprising result is again the store dummy which is negative, but also here it becomes positive if the regression is estimated without controlling for seller reputation.
***Table 3***
Expert advice on eBay books
The growing popularity of eBay has lead to a proliferation of publications dedicated to help both buyers and sellers who participate on it. The recommendations printed in these books can safely be assumed to consist of an upper bound of the typical eBay seller's sophistication, as "experts" presumably write them. If people writing books about eBay fail to take into account how the actions of other sellers influence the profitability of different ending times, it seems particularly plausible that eBay sellers in general fail to do so as well.
A research assistant (blind to the hypothesis of this paper) collected ending-time recommendations from all (26) eBay books available at two local bookstores. 7 Eight books did not mention ending-time, or considered neither demand nor supply in their recommendation.
Fourteen books make a recommendation based on aggregate demand alone and hence fall prey to competition neglect. For example, the book "eBay Strategies" (Wingo, 2004) has the following recommendation "Timing your auctions to end during peak times will significantly improve traffic to your auctions, resulting in more bids" (they then recommend 5-9 PM PT).
Only two books took into account competition when making ending-time recommendations. For example the aptly titled eBay Myth-Buster (Busch, 2004) states "If
selling a fairly common item, high-traffic nights might be the absolute worst time to close (too much competition)"
The content of the eBay books, in sum, supports the interpretation given to the excessive entry pattern: all advice is a function (only) of demand considerations and primarily only of aggregate demand. This means that, on the one hand, eBay sellers literally engage in competition neglect rather than simply behave as if they did, and on the other, that none of the alternative explanations I consider (or any I don't for that matter) are explicitly considered by eBay experts who write advice books (e.g., no book suggests listing in the evenings because it is more convenient to do so, or that bidders choose bidding times based on when the most auctions are ending).
7 Two books gave ambiguous advice and were not assigned to any type.
Conclusions
Based on the experimental and survey based literatures documenting competition neglect, i.e. players' tendency underestimate the impact of their competitors' actions, I
hypothesized that firms would tend to over-supply high-demand markets. Exploiting the fact that bidders bid last-minute on online auctions, creating sequentially and at least partially independent markets, I tested this hypothesis by studying the ending-time decisions of eBay sellers. As predicted, a disproportionate fraction of them end their auctions during peak hours, leading to lower probability of sale and final prices during such hours. This excessive entry appears to be driven by the subset of sellers who intentionally choose ending times, rather than by those who do so mindlessly.
Studying the prediction of excess entry into high demand markets within the context of the timing of auctions for commodities has two notable advantages. The first is that, unlike most other settings, markets here differ only in their demand levels, making comparisons of outcomes across markets much easier to interpret; there are no potential confounds of entry costs, required expertise, uncertainty, and so on. The second advantage is that, again unlike most other settings, by studying the performance of a commodity, counterfactual outcomes for items offered in one market are available from other markets, and hence one can estimate with a high degree of certainty what a seller would have obtained had she entered a different market.
The chosen setting, however, is of course not free of disadvantages. In particular, although determining the time-of-day to end an auction is in theory analogous to a market entry decision, there are important differences between them in practice. Most notably, the decisions studied here are repetitive and for relatively small-stakes, while market entry decision are typically infrequent and for very large stakes. Similarly, market entry decisions are made by a few "experts" or entrepreneurs, while ending-time decisions are made by individual sellers (though many of them are firms).
There are two points worth considering with regards to these limitations. The first is that agents making repetitive decisions would be expected to act more rationally than those making one-off decisions, by virtue of having had more opportunities to learn from feedback. The second is that in the data used here, larger sellers were more rather than less likely to exhibit competition neglect.
Another concern with the present study is the possibility that DVDs are an odd product for eBay. In particular, if it is typically the case that goods sold on eBay do not have close substitutes, then ignoring competition may be a fine strategy for most sellers most of the time.
On eBay, however, goods with substitutes are the norm rather than the exception. On November 3 rd of 2008, for instance, there were over 850,000 auctions for computer and networking products, over 1.2 million for DVDs, and over 3 million for books (excluding antique and collectible books); on the same day there were just over 200,000 auctions for antiques and also just over 200,000 for entertainment memorabilia (source: http://listings.ebay.com/).
In addition, sellers offering large numbers of DVDs probably specialize in the sale of such products (few sellers would be expected to sell both rare dolls, say, and best-seller DVDs), and hence peak-listing is unlikely to usually be an optimal strategy for them.
In terms of generalizability of the findings. Intuitively, excessive entry is more likely to occur in situations where sellers do not receive feedback about the profitability of supplying offpeak. This is likely to occur, for example, in settings where independent small sellers make and observe one or just a few entry decisions, as is the case with owners of small business entrepreneurs (e.g. independent restaurants) or with people's decision of investment in human capital (e.g. deciding what major to study or where to look for work). It is less likely to occur in settings where large firms make repetitive decisions, such as food chains deciding on new locations for their restaurants.
Excess entry into peak demand markets is also likely to occur in industries where a highdemand market is so focal that even large sellers will not have experimented with off-peak demand, as seems to be the case with the movie industry's reluctance to launch blockbuster films on non-peak movie-going weekends (Einav, 2007) . Notes: Entries in table correspond to marginal effects estimated at sample means (i.e. impact on dependent variable of increasing independent variable in one unit) obtained employing a probit regression. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis below marginal effects. A/B ratio is the ratio of percentage of daily auctions ending during auction's last 180 minutes, to the percentage of daily bids over the same time period. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
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APPENDIX A. HOW MOVIE TITLES WERE INFERRED FROM ITEM DESCRIPTIONS
As was mentioned in the data description, eBay does not utilize unique product identifiers for their listings, so bidders and researchers must rely on sellers' descriptions of their items to identify what's being auctioned. Bidders can easily do this because they see but a handful of auctions, which furthermore, they come across only after querying relevant keywords themselves.
As a researcher interested in identifying several thousand items, in contrast, I had to develop an at least partially automatized process to do this. To this end I selected a set of DVD titles against which the seller descriptions were to be automatically compared (see Appendix B
for details on the selection of such titles).
For each movie title I chose a few keywords to search in the descriptions of each of the over 500,000 auctions in the DVD category. For example, for the movie "A walk to remember," items whose descriptions contained the keywords "walk" and "remember" where initially classified as such movie.
Because different movies often have similar names this initial process lead to a nontrivial share of false positives which included completely different movies with similar names, closely related films (e.g. sequels and remakes) and different DVD versions of the same original movie.
In order to systematically identify these false-positives I tabulated, for each movie, all words used in the descriptions of all items. The resulting list was then inspected "by hand" for suspicious words that may indicate a false-positive.
For example, among auctions categorized as "Gladiator" (the Oscar winning film) the word "Eroticvs" appeared 5 times. By reading the full description of the corresponding listings I discovered the existence of the film "Gladiator Eroticvs", a different movie altogether. The word "Jurassic" also appeared on a few other descriptions of auctions identified as "Gladiator". Upon examining their full descriptions, it was determined that these auctions offered a bundle which included two films: Gladiator and Jurassic Park. Finally, the high frequency of the word "Signature" pointed to the fact that there were -at the time-two versions of "Gladiator", a standard one (containing 2 DVDs) and a "Signature Series" one (containing 3). For this process I supplemented my personal movie knowledge with the websites Amazon.com, IMDB.com, and
DVDcompare.net.
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This process is obviously very time intensive. Because the time it takes to identify false positives is relatively fixed per movie title rather than per auction, I constructed the subsamples based on popular titles; that way a maximum number of observations was obtained with a given amount of time devoted to data-cleaning. Not a single classification or exclusion was made based on the impact of excluding that/those observation(s) from the sample on the regression results.
APPENDIX B. SELECTION OF MOVIE-TITLES
The single-DVD list of movies corresponds to movies appearing on a weekly top-20 list in the Internet Movie Database archive (http://www.imdb.com) at least once during the two months immediately before the sample's month or listed as the top-20 bestsellers for the previous year.
I am not aware of any best-seller list for multiple-DVD sets. To identify common titles I tabulated the word frequency of auctions selling for more than $30. I eliminated all words used less than 100 times, and also eliminated those that were generic descriptors rather than movie title identifiers (e.g., 'DVD', 'NEW', 'shipping', etc). The list of words that remained were then used to uncover titles of multiple-DVD sets often sold on eBay. 
APPENDIX C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AT THE INDIVIDUAL MOVIE TITLE LEVEL

